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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
A jury found Craig Claxton guilty of conspiring to 
possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, but the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands of the United States entered a 
judgment of acquittal in Claxton‟s favor on the ground that 
there was not enough evidence for “a reasonable jur[y] to 
conclude … that … Claxton knowingly participated in th[e] 
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conspiracy.”  (Joint App. at 6.)  The government appeals that 
decision, urging that the evidence suffices to establish 
Claxton‟s involvement in the charged conspiracy.  We agree, 
and will reverse the District Court‟s judgment of acquittal and 
remand for sentencing.  
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
Claxton was indicted with other individuals for 
participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846.  The indictment alleged that, from at least 
1999 until October 2005, the conspirators sought to possess 
large quantities of cocaine in order to distribute that cocaine 
for “significant financial gain and profit.”  (Joint App. at 43.)   
 
A. Facts 
 
James Springette was the conspiracy‟s leader, running 
a drug-trafficking organization that routinely brought cocaine 
from Colombia into Venezuela, and then flew bales of it to 
the waters surrounding the Virgin Islands so that it could be 
retrieved, stored, and eventually smuggled into the 
continental United States for sale.   
 
 Springette‟s “organization was run like a large 
company” (id. at 110) with various departments.  (See, e.g., 
id. at 89 (Springette‟s testimony that his organization was 
“like [a] watch … .  [Y]ou might see one or two pieces 
moving on your watch, but under your watch there are many 
moving pieces”).)  Elton Turnbull, Springette‟s cousin and his 
“right-hand man” (id. at 72), characterized Springette as the 
“president” of that “company” (id. at 111).  Gelean Mark 
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served under Springette,
1
 and was responsible for shipping 
the cocaine from the Virgin Islands into North Carolina 
through couriers.  Glenson Isaac received the cocaine in 
North Carolina, sold it, and sent the proceeds back to Mark in 
the Virgin Islands.     
 
Isaac acknowledged that he was “the main guy in 
North Carolina to receive and sell multiple kilos of cocaine 
and send[] the proceeds back.”  (Id. at 126.)  He testified at 
trial that he used female couriers to carry the drug money 
from North Carolina to the Virgin Islands.  In exchange for 
$1,000, those couriers would travel to the island of St. 
Thomas with $190,000 or more packed in their luggage.  
Once in St. Thomas, a member of Springette‟s organization 
would pick them up so that the money they transported could 
be collected by Mark.  (See id. at 102 (Turnbull‟s testimony 
that “[Mark] would either pick up the couriers personally 
himself, or have another member of the organization pick up 
the couriers”).) 
 
Isaac identified Claxton as one of the “member[s] of 
the organization” who performed that task.  (Id. at 136.)  
Indeed, although Springette testified that he did not know or 
deal with Claxton, Isaac told the jury that Claxton helped him 
“sell[] … hundreds and hundreds of kilograms of cocaine” 
(id. at 171) by “retriev[ing] the girls out of the airport” in St. 
Thomas, “tak[ing] them to Mark, check[ing] them into [a] 
hotel[,] and pay[ing] them” (id. at 136).  Other evidence at 
                                              
1
 The indictment states that Mark was “the owner, 
leader and organizer of th[e] drug trafficking organization.”  
(Joint App. at 44.)  The evidence at trial, however, 
demonstrated that Mark was subordinate to Springette.   
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trial confirmed that account, showing that Claxton, who used 
the aliases “Flintstone” and “Sunku,” interacted with Isaac‟s 
couriers on eight different occasions between June 2004 and 
July 2005. 
 
  1. The Couriers’ Testimony 
 
Three different couriers – Alexis Wright, Valencia 
Roberts, and Demeatra Cox – offered testimony detailing 
their encounters with Claxton while transporting cash from 
North Carolina to the Virgin Islands on Isaac‟s behalf.   
 
   i. Alexis Wright 
 
Wright was Isaac‟s coworker at a McDonald‟s 
restaurant in North Carolina.  She testified that she made six 
trips to St. Thomas at Isaac‟s behest, and saw Claxton on four 
of those trips.   
 
Wright first saw Claxton in June 2004 when she 
traveled to St. Thomas with a friend.  Upon arriving in St. 
Thomas, Isaac called Wright on her cell phone and told her to 
“look for the skinny guy who has half of his face shaved.”  
(Id. at 179.)  Shortly thereafter, Wright was approached by 
Claxton, who fit Isaac‟s description and introduced himself to 
Wright as “Flintstone.”  Wright handed Claxton the phone so 
that Isaac could confirm that Wright had met the right 
individual.  After Isaac did that, Wright and her friend left the 
airport with Claxton and an unidentified individual (“Person 
X”).2   
                                              
2
 For ease of reference, we use the designation “Person 
X” for any person who was not identified at trial by a name or 
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Wright, Claxton, and her friend were then dropped off 
to eat lunch while Person X left with Wright‟s luggage.  After 
they ate, Claxton called Person X to pick them up.  Person X 
arrived and took Wright and her friend to their hotel, where 
Wright‟s luggage was returned.  During the following three or 
four days that Wright and her friend spent in St. Thomas, 
Claxton repeatedly took them out to eat.  On their way to one 
particular restaurant, they stopped at a place known as the 
“feed shop.”  (See id. at 181 (Wright‟s testimony that Claxton 
took her to restaurants while she was in St. Thomas and that, 
while “going towards the restaurant,” they “stopped at a feed 
shop”).)  Springette‟s organization used the feed shop to 
launder its drug money.  (See id. at 122-23 (Turnbull‟s 
testimony that he owned the feed shop with Mark and used it 
as a legitimate business so as to “allow the opportunity for 
[the drug] money to be laundered through the business”).)  
While there, Wright saw “Butchie,”3 whom Wright knew 
from a previous trip she had taken to St. Thomas with Isaac.   
 
Wright next saw Claxton in September 2004, when she 
was again met by Claxton and Person X after flying money to 
St. Thomas on Isaac‟s behalf.  Wright did not recall if she 
was supposed to be paid for making that trip, but she received 
$1,000 from Claxton when she arrived.  She saw him a third 
time at the St. Thomas airport when she traveled to the Virgin 
Islands in December 2004.  Claxton, who was alone to greet 
                                                                                                     
a nickname, although the various unidentified individuals to 
whom we refer are not necessarily the same person. 
3
 As with other individuals who were mentioned at 
trial, see supra note 2 and infra note 4, Butchie‟s real name 
was never revealed to the jury. 
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her on that occasion, escorted her to a car, and, after driving 
with her from the airport, stopped on the side of the road 
where another car, occupied by an individual Wright 
identified at trial by the nickname “What‟s Up,”4 was already 
parked.  Leaving Wright in his car, Claxton took Wright‟s 
luggage to What‟s Up‟s car, got inside that car, and remained 
there for five-to-ten minutes.  After returning to his own 
vehicle, Claxton drove Wright to the airport, as she had 
planned to fly back to North Carolina that same day.  They 
did not reach the airport in time, however, so Claxton paid for 
Wright‟s hotel room for the night.   
 
Wright also saw Claxton during a July 2005 trip for 
Isaac, when Claxton shuttled her to the airport.   
 
   ii. Valencia Roberts 
 
Roberts was Wright‟s cousin, and was recruited by 
Wright to “bring some money [from North Carolina] to St. 
Thomas on [Isaac‟s] behalf.”  (Id. at 211.)  Roberts first 
traveled to St. Thomas for that purpose in July 2004.  Upon 
arriving in St. Thomas, Claxton, who identified himself as 
Flintstone, picked Roberts up from the airport.  After leaving 
the airport, Claxton stopped on the side of the road next to the 
feed shop, and took Roberts‟s bag to another car that drove 
off with it.  Claxton then “went inside of the feed shop … for 
                                              
4
 In arguing against Claxton‟s motion for a judgment 
of acquittal, the government suggested to the District Court 
that the evidence showed that “What‟s Up” was Mark.  The 
government has not made that factual representation on 
appeal, however, and it does not appear that the jury was ever 
apprised of the real name of “What‟s Up.” 
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maybe ten or fifteen minutes” before eventually leaving to 
take Roberts to her hotel.  (Id. at 214.)  Claxton returned 
Roberts‟s bag to her a few hours later, when he picked her up 
to take her out to eat.   
 
Roberts testified that she also saw Claxton during a 
September 2004 trip, but did not elaborate about what 
happened on that occasion. 
 
   iii. Demeatra Cox 
 
Cox was recruited to travel to St. Thomas for Isaac by 
Everett Mills, who served as Isaac‟s cocaine distribution 
partner in North Carolina.  She offered testimony regarding 
two trips she made to St. Thomas on Isaac‟s behalf.   
 
The first occurred in July 2004, when Isaac asked Cox 
to go to St. Thomas and “bring something with [her].”  (Id. at 
227.)  Claxton, who identified himself as “Sunku,” picked 
Cox up from the airport, “grabbed [her] bag” from the 
conveyor belt, “dropped [her] off at the [hotel], and … took 
the bag with him.”  (Id. at 229.)  Her clothes were returned to 
her in a different bag later that day, and she spent three 
additional days in St. Thomas before being escorted back to 
the airport by Claxton.  Isaac returned Cox‟s original bag to 
her after she was back in North Carolina.   
 
Cox made a second trip to St. Thomas in August 2004, 
and was met by Claxton and Butchie when she arrived.  
Butchie took Cox‟s bag with him, while Claxton left to take 
Cox to her hotel.  Her clothes were returned in a new bag 
later that day when Isaac, Claxton, Butchie, and an individual 
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she identified as “Maestro” met her at her hotel.  During that 
meeting, Isaac paid her for making the trip.   
 
  2. Isaac’s Testimony 
 
Isaac, who admitted to being one of the “main guy[s]” 
in Springette‟s organization (id. at 126) and being involved 
“in drug-dealing activities most of [his] life” (id. at 159), also 
incriminated Claxton at trial.  Repeatedly identifying Claxton 
as one of the “member[s] of the organization” (id. at 136), 
Isaac testified that he traveled to St. Thomas on at least ten 
occasions and met with Claxton and other “organization” 
members at a property referred to as “the farm” (id. at 152), 
where the organization‟s cocaine was stored.  During those 
visits, Isaac and other members of the organization would 
“talk about drug activities and fight dogs.”  (Id. at 156.)  Isaac 
also testified that, at some point in time,
5
 he went with 
Claxton to Atlantic City to gamble and try to win $60,000 to 
settle a cocaine-related debt with Mark.   
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
After the government rested its case, Claxton moved 
for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29.  The District Court expressed concern about 
the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the government, 
but reserved judgment on the motion and submitted the case 
to the jury.  The jury, in turn, found Claxton guilty, prompting 
him to renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  On four 
different occasions, the District Court considered whether to 
                                              
5
 As discussed infra in note 20, Claxton argues that the 
gambling trip occurred after the conspiracy concluded.  
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grant the motion, and ultimately decided to do so.
6
  Speaking 
at a sentencing hearing, the Court indicated it would issue a 
written opinion memorializing its ruling, though apparently 
that was not done.  The Court did, however, enter a judgment 
of acquittal, which the government timely appealed.   
 
II. Discussion
7
 
 
The government argues that the District Court errantly 
decided the evidence was insufficient to establish Claxton‟s 
guilt.  In considering that argument, we “review the [trial] 
record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 
available evidence.”  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 
133 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In the context of a drug conspiracy prosecution 
brought under 21 U.S.C. § 846, that standard can only be met 
                                              
6
 The Court heard arguments on Claxton‟s motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the government‟s 
case on May 30, 2010, in separate motion hearings on 
February 15, 2011 and April 5, 2011, and then again at a May 
11, 2011 sentencing hearing.   
7
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (stating that the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands “shall have the 
jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States”).  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613, and “exercise[] plenary review” of the Court‟s 
judgment of acquittal.  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 
480 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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if the evidence establishes “(1) a shared unity of purpose, (2) 
an intent to achieve a common illegal goal, and (3) an 
agreement to work toward that goal, which [the defendant] 
knowingly joined.”  United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 
(3d Cir. 2010); see United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 
147 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).  Here, Claxton contends that the 
District Court properly entered a judgment of acquittal 
because the evidence at trial failed to prove that he was a 
knowing conspirator in a criminal enterprise, let alone one 
that was engaged in drug trafficking.  Thus, the question we 
must answer is whether a rational fact-finder could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Claxton knowingly 
participated in Springette‟s drug-trafficking organization.8  
 
A. Proving Knowledge in Drug Conspiracy Cases 
 
As we have often recognized, a finding of guilt in a 
conspiracy case does not depend on the government 
introducing direct evidence that a defendant was a knowing 
participant in the conspiracy; circumstantial evidence can 
carry the day.  See Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (“A conspiracy can 
be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” (emphasis 
                                              
8
 Because the government has not, at any point, argued 
that Claxton was willfully blind to his involvement in 
Springette‟s organization, we do not consider whether a 
rational jury could have found that Claxton acted 
“knowingly” based on that concept.  Cf. United States v. 
Cordero, 815 F. Supp. 2d 821, 832 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting 
that, because a willful blindness instruction was given, the 
“the jury verdict must stand” if the evidence supports the fact 
that the defendant “deliberately ignored the high probability 
that [he or she was] participating in a drug conspiracy”). 
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added)); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 
1988) (“The elements of a conspiracy may be proven entirely 
by circumstantial evidence … .”).  In drug conspiracy cases, 
however, we have arguably asked more of prosecutors than 
our statements regarding the adequacy of circumstantial 
evidence express, “requir[ing] some additional piece of 
evidence imputing knowledge of drugs to the defendant” even 
in “the presence of otherwise suspicious circumstances.”  
Boria, 592 F.3d at 482; see id. at 488 n.12 (Fisher, J., 
concurring) (“It may be that the difficulty of producing 
evidence that the defendant knew that the subject matter was 
a controlled substance has turned our standard of review, not 
in name but in application, into a requirement for direct 
evidence.”).   
 
In United States v. Cartwright, for example, a divided 
panel of our court held the evidence insufficient to establish a 
drug conspiracy charge even though the defendant, who had 
“a semi-automatic firearm, a cellular phone, $180 in cash, and 
a Motorola Timeport two-way text messaging device” on his 
person, was observed walking side-by-side with an alleged 
coconspirator who had just negotiated a drug-sale transaction.  
359 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2004).  As we explained it, there 
was simply no basis upon which a jury could conclude that 
the defendant had knowledge that he was participating in a 
drug-trafficking conspiracy.
9
  Id.  A divided panel of our 
                                              
9
 More specifically, the only evidence supporting the 
defendant‟s knowledge of drugs was that: 
(1) [The defendant] made his first appearance 
in the breezeway at the same time that [the 
coconspirator] was observed carrying the 
shopping bag containing the cocaine; (2) [the 
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court likewise deemed the evidence insufficient to uphold a 
jury verdict in United States v. Idowu, because the only 
evidence tying the defendant to a drug-purchase conspiracy 
was the fact that the defendant drove in a vehicle with an 
alleged coconspirator, opened a bag in that vehicle to display 
money to a putative drug dealer, and said “[t]hey didn‟t pack 
this thing” to his coconspirator upon receiving a different bag 
from the drug dealer.  157 F.3d 265, 267-68 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 
In United States v. Boria, we summarized those and 
other drug conspiracy cases holding evidence insufficient to 
sustain a conspiracy conviction,
10
 and we deemed it notable 
                                                                                                     
defendant] walked side-by-side with [the 
coconspirator] through the breezeway and the 
two were observed talking to each other; (3) 
[the defendant] possessed a semi-automatic 
firearm, a cellular phone, $180 in cash, and a 
Motorola Timeport two-way text messaging 
device; and (4) [the defendant] did not possess 
any keys to a vehicle of his own. 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 288.  Although that evidence 
“support[ed] a finding that [the defendant] acted as a lookout 
for [the coconspirator],” we deemed it insufficient to sustain a 
drug conspiracy verdict.  Id. at 286. 
10
 In addition to Cartwright and Idowu, we surveyed 
four other drug conspiracy cases in Boria.  See United States 
v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding the 
evidence insufficient where a defendant who had no prior 
relationship with the alleged coconspirators “check[ed] on a 
bag” that had drugs in it, at the direction of one of the 
conspirators, but where there was no evidence that the 
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that “none of the[m] … included co-conspirator statements 
implicating the defendant.”  592 F.3d at 484.  Relying on that 
fact in particular, we distinguished the cases in which we 
have set aside drug conspiracy verdicts, and upheld the jury‟s 
guilty verdict.
11
  The defendant in that case, Ruben Boria, was 
                                                                                                     
defendant knew the contents of the bag); United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1114 (3d Cir. 1991) (evidence that 
the defendant “performed surveillance, spoke to 
coconspirators, and possessed surveillance equipment” when 
arrested did not permit a “reasonable jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew that cocaine or 
another controlled substance was the object of the 
transaction”); Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91 (concluding that while 
there was “ample circumstantial evidence … [for] … the jury 
[to] have concluded that [the defendant] was involved in a 
conspiracy” because he served as a lookout, spoke with a 
coconspirator during the operation, and “fictitiously obtained 
[a] CB radio … in the car he drove,” there was no evidence 
he “knew that a controlled substance was” involved in that 
conspiracy and the conspiracy verdict was therefore 
improper); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (holding the evidence insufficient where the 
defendant rode with an alleged coconspirator in a truck with 
marijuana in a padlocked compartment in the trunk, because 
there was no evidence that the defendant had access to the 
compartment or key and the evidence adduced was “perfectly 
consistent with innocence”).  
11
 We also observed that “[t]here was no evidence of a 
prior relationship between the defendant and the 
coconspirators” in several of the drug conspiracy cases in 
which we have, in the past, deemed the evidence to be 
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charged with participating in a drug conspiracy after he was 
caught driving a tractor-trailer that contained “cocaine hidden 
among boxes of mostly rotten fruit” in the trailer, which he 
never accessed.  Id. at 478.  At trial, a witness named Jose 
Alvarado testified that he was told by a conspirator, Miguel 
Morel, that Boria would meet him early in the morning to 
pick up the tractor-trailer from him in order to take it “to a 
garage to unload the drugs that were in the back.”12  Id. at 478 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Although 
Alvarado had never dealt with Boria before, he arrived as 
promised that morning, “identified himself as Ruben[,] and 
confirmed that Morel had sent him.”  Id. at 479.  Those 
suspicious circumstances, as we explained, would permit a 
rational jury to conclude that Boria knew “something criminal 
was afoot.”  Id. at 486.   
 
While that did not, itself, suffice to sustain a 
conspiracy verdict in light of “our strict approach to 
sufficiency in drug conspiracy cases,” id. at 481 n.9, we 
concluded that Alvarado‟s testimony relaying Morel‟s 
description of Boria‟s role sufficed to enable a rational jury to 
find that Boria had knowledge that he was participating in a 
conspiracy involving “drugs, as opposed to some other form 
of contraband,” id. at 486.  As we explained it: 
 
                                                                                                     
inadequate.  Boria, 592 F.3d at 483 (citing Thomas, 114 F.3d 
at 405-06 and Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 291). 
12
 While the conspirators evidently thought Alvarado 
was working with them, he was actually a “Drug 
Enforcement Agency … informant” who “managed to inform 
law enforcement” about the scheme.  Boria, 592 F.3d at 478. 
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[T]he case before us does have additional facts 
imputing knowledge of drugs.  We reach this 
conclusion after considering the suspicious 
circumstances of this case, including that Boria 
met … Alvarado [and a coconspirator] early in 
the morning after only a few hours of sleep, … 
did not hesitate in approaching the tractor-trailer 
containing the cocaine and then approaching the 
vehicle Alvarado was driving, … [and] 
confirmed his identity and that Morel had sent 
him … . 
 
The “truly distinguishing fact,” however, 
is Alvarado‟s testimony that Boria‟s role was to 
“take [the tractor-trailer] to a garage to unload 
the drugs that were in the back of the tractor-
trailer.”  Alvarado re-iterated Boria‟s role on 
cross-examination, testifying that, according to 
Morel, Boria was responsible for “taking the 
truck from [his] hands to take it to another 
garage to unload it,” and for “tak[ing] the driver 
of the tractor-trailer to finish off what needs to 
be done inside the truck.”  Although Boria 
never accessed the trailer, this co-conspirator 
testimony imputes to Boria knowledge that the 
tractor-trailer he was assigned to direct to a 
garage contained drugs, which is the additional 
fact necessary to support the jury‟s guilty 
verdict.  The cases in which we declined to find 
sufficient evidence did not include such 
evidence, and we find its presence in this case 
decisive.  
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Id. at 485 (second paragraph alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted).   
 
 In so holding, we relied on United States v. Reyeros, 
where we likewise distinguished the “cases in which we 
reversed drug possession and distribution conspiracy 
convictions for lack of evidence that the defendant knew the 
purpose of the conspiracy involved drugs,” based on the 
presence of a statement that could be attributed to the 
defendant.  537 F.3d 270, 278 (3d Cir. 2008).  There, unlike 
Boria, the witness recounted an admission by a defendant that 
evinced that defendant‟s knowledge of drugs.  See Reyeros, 
537 F.3d at 279 (testimony that the defendant said he 
“wouldn‟t take little amounts of drugs to use his Customs 
position, it would be too little of a deal.  He needed big deals.  
Big drug deals” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  But although Alvarado‟s testimony did not, as the 
statement in Reyeros did, relay a statement the defendant 
himself made, we did not find that distinction significant to 
our sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry.  Rather, “we 
conclude[d] it [was] appropriate to attribute [to Boria] 
Morel‟s statement regarding Boria‟s role” in the conspiracy, 
based on the principle that “statements of one [coconspirator] 
can … be attribut[ed] to all.”13  Boria, 592 F.3d at 485 n.10 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
13
 That principle is embodied in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801, which provides that statements are not hearsay 
if they are offered against an opposing party and are “made 
by the party‟s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  The theory is that 
“statements of one [conspirator] can … be attributable to all” 
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 B. Claxton’s Knowledge of Drugs 
 
Here, the District Court acknowledged when entering a 
judgment of acquittal in Claxton‟s favor that the evidence 
permits a “fair inference” that Claxton was “involved in 
something, if not illicit, at least suspicious.”  (Joint App. at 5.)  
That is a striking understatement.  Notwithstanding Claxton‟s 
protestations that the evidence fails to establish that “[he] 
knew he was participating in a criminal enterprise” 
(Appellee‟s Opening Br. at 12), there is strong evidence that 
he knew what was inside the couriers‟ luggage he was 
helping to transport was money from illegal activities, (see, 
e.g.,  Joint App. at 184-85 (Wright‟s testimony about her 
December 2004 trip in which Claxton picked her up, brought 
her luggage to What‟s Up‟s car, and stayed there for five-to-
ten minutes before returning to his own car to drive Wright 
back to the airport that same day); see also id. at 233-34 
(Cox‟s testimony that Claxton and Isaac were “joking about 
bringing [her] … clothes [which had been packed in her 
luggage] back in the [new] garment bag,” and that Isaac paid 
her $1,000 in front of Claxton); id. at 183 (Wright‟s 
testimony that Claxton paid her $1,000 in exchange for 
bringing her bag to the Virgin Islands)).  Thus, we are 
confident that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Claxton knew he was a conspirator in 
some kind of illicit enterprise, as he plainly knew “something 
criminal was afoot.”  Boria, 592 F.3d at 486.   
 
That, of course, is not enough under our precedents to 
sustain his conviction; there must also be enough evidence for 
                                                                                                     
because “each conspirator is an agent of the other.”  United 
States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614, 628 (3d Cir. 1986).   
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a jury to rationally find that Claxton had knowledge that he 
was involved in an illegal enterprise involving “drugs, as 
opposed to some other form of contraband.”  Id.  We 
conclude that the evidence, as a whole, permits such a finding 
because Claxton was expressly identified as a member of the 
conspiracy, repeatedly took actions to further its ends, and 
had a close and repeated association with its members and 
facilities. 
 
We begin with Isaac‟s testimony identifying Claxton 
as a coconspirator.  That testimony, as in Boria, distinguishes 
this case from those in which we have held evidence of the 
defendants‟ knowledge of drugs to be lacking.  Isaac was a 
“main guy” in Springette‟s organization (Joint App. at 126), 
and specifically identified Claxton as an “organization 
member,”14 (see id. at 136 (identifying Claxton as one of the 
“member[s] of the organization”); id. at 146 (describing 
Claxton as a “member[] of the organization”); id. at 152 
(stating Claxton was an “organization” member he “[saw] at 
the farm”)).  Isaac also observed that, by working with the 
money couriers when called upon to do so, Claxton helped in 
the organization‟s business of trafficking “hundreds and 
hundreds of kilograms of cocaine.”  (Id. at 171.)  Isaac‟s 
                                              
14
 Claxton emphasizes that an organizational chart 
Isaac prepared does not identify Claxton as a member of 
Springette‟s organization.  While true, his argument that that 
omission undermines any proof of his guilt was considered 
and evidently found wanting by the jury; it is not our role to 
revisit it.  Cf. Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133 (noting that we “review 
the [trial] record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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identifications of Claxton do, to be sure, differ from the 
coconspirator testimony offered in Boria in two respects.  
First, because they are identifications at trial as opposed to 
statements made during the course of the conspiracy, they 
cannot simply be treated as Claxton‟s own admissions that he 
was a member of the organization of which Isaac spoke.  Cf. 
Boria, 592 F.3d at 485 n.10 (attributing “Morel‟s statement 
regarding Boria‟s role” in the conspiracy to Boria based on 
the principle “that … statements of one [coconspirator] can 
… be attribut[ed] to all” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Second, because they do not expressly refer 
to Claxton‟s knowledge of drugs, they require the jury to 
make an additional inference to establish such knowledge.  
Cf. id. at 486 (“Alvarado‟s testimony that Boria was 
responsible for unloading the drugs, attributable to Boria as a 
co-conspirator, …  serves as the crucial … fact imputing 
knowledge of drugs … .”).   
 
But while a direct statement that can be attributed to a 
defendant as an admission may be more probative of 
knowledge of drugs than an admitted-conspirator‟s trial 
testimony regarding who was or was not his coconspirator, 
the latter account remains highly pertinent to the question of 
the defendant‟s knowing complicity in the crime.  Cf. United 
States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1155-57 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(testimony by coconspirators regarding the defendant‟s 
participation in a conspiracy was, on its own, sufficient to 
sustain a marijuana distribution conspiracy charge even 
absent independent corroboration, because “[t]he jury … 
credited [the coconspirators‟] version of events”).  It does not 
establish knowledge as directly as does an admission, but we 
have never set the bar as high as that.  Again, “a conspiracy 
may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence,” Wexler, 
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838 F.2d at 90, and we have asked simply that the 
circumstantial inferences drawn from the evidence bear a 
“logical or convincing connection to established fact,” 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 291.  For the very reason that direct 
evidence of criminal knowledge is unusual, we have 
explicitly recognized that the government may 
circumstantially establish the element of knowledge “grain-
by-grain until the scale finally tips.”  United States v. Iafelice, 
978 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
In this case, Isaac‟s account that Claxton was a 
“member of the organization” is strong circumstantial 
evidence of Claxton‟s knowing involvement in Springette‟s 
drug conspiracy.  Unlike the evidence in many drug 
conspiracy cases we have dealt with in the past, see supra 
note 10 and accompanying text, Isaac‟s testimony permits the 
rational conclusion that Claxton knowingly participated in a 
drug (as opposed to some other) conspiracy.  Cf. Idowu, 157 
F.3d at 269, 270 (noting the “government‟s strongest 
argument [was] that [the coconspirator‟s] invitation to [the 
putative drug dealer] to get into the car, in which Idowu was 
sitting, reflects such total confidence in Idowu that an 
inference can be drawn that Idowu knew the full nature of the 
transaction,” but determining that was not enough to show 
that “Idowu knew that drugs were in fact the subject matter of 
the transaction”).   
 
The evidence at trial showed that Springette‟s drug 
“organization was run like a large company” (Joint App. at 
110), with various departments, managers, and employees, 
(see id. at 89 (Springette‟s testimony that his organization 
was “like [a] watch”)).  It was in existence for a number of 
years, and involved multiple drug-related transactions.  
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Claxton was responsible for facilitating several of those 
transactions, and did so by performing the same kinds of 
tasks, often with the same people.
15
  Cf. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 
at 288 (involving only a single drug transaction).  None of the 
prior drug conspiracy cases in which we have found the 
evidence insufficient involved multiple transactions, see 
supra note 10 and accompanying text, and although the 
number of transactions here does not, on its own, prove 
Claxton‟s knowledge of the character of the conspiracy, it 
does make it more likely that he knew the business he was 
about.  It also helps explain what Isaac meant when he called 
Claxton a “member of the organization.”  (Joint App. at 136.)  
Indeed, Claxton‟s repeated assistance in the transport of large 
sums of drug money prompts a fair inference that the 
references at trial to his membership in “the organization” 
(see, e.g., id. at 102 (Turnbull‟s testimony that “another 
member of the organization” would pick up the couriers if 
Mark did not do so himself)) constituted proof of something 
more than passive or unwitting participation in a vaguely 
suspicious enterprise involving some other form of 
contraband.   
 
While different people played different roles in 
Springette‟s organization and the evidence indicates that there 
                                              
15
 Using one of two aliases, Claxton dealt with various 
couriers on eight different occasions when they visited the 
Virgin Islands to transport drug money from North Carolina 
on Isaac‟s behalf.  Claxton did that by working with the same 
cast of characters – the three couriers, Isaac, and Butchie – 
and, with some minor variations, performing the same general 
tasks. 
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were various degrees of culpability among the conspirators,
16
 
the organization‟s purpose was to traffic drugs and the jury 
heard multiple witnesses testify about the roles various 
conspirators played in facilitating that objective.  (See id. at 
65 (Springette‟s testimony that Turnbull was Springette‟s 
“eyes and ears overseas” who helped him “do drug 
trafficking”); id. at 95-96 (Turnbull‟s testimony that Mark 
was “brought into the organization” in 1999 and that his role 
was to transport cocaine from the Virgin Islands to North 
Carolina); id. at 126 (Isaac‟s testimony that he was “the main 
guy in North Carolina to receive and sell multiple kilos of 
cocaine and send[] the proceeds back to St. Thomas”).)  
Claxton‟s role was, in Isaac‟s words, to “retrieve the girls out 
of the airport[,] … take them to Mark, check them into the 
hotel and pay them.”  (Id. at 136.)  Given the sums of money 
involved, it was fair for the jury to understand that this was 
not a task for just anyone – it was a job for a “member of the 
organization” (id. at 102), and even high-ranking members of 
the conspiracy, such as Mark, completed it on some 
occasions.
17
   
                                              
16
 As Claxton correctly points out, the testimony 
regarding his involvement with the couriers covered only a 
brief period of the charged conspiracy.  Springette, moreover, 
did not know or deal with him.   
17
 Acknowledging that “we have not explicitly so 
stated” (Dissenting Op. at 2), our dissenting colleague posits 
that knowledge can be inferred from a defendant‟s 
participation in a conspiracy “only when dominion and 
control over the contraband is inherent to the role that the 
defendant agreed to perform,” (Id. at 3).  Thus, he says, it 
cannot logically be inferred that Claxton had knowledge of 
drugs since he only had dominion and control over the 
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Moreover, the jury could draw inferences about 
Claxton‟s knowledge of drugs based on his association with, 
and close proximity to, other conspiracy members and the 
facilities of the organization.  See Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 279 
n.12 (noting that the defendant‟s knowledge of drugs was also 
supported by the close relationship between the defendant and 
his coconspirator brother).
18
  The organization had a base 
                                                                                                     
conspiracy‟s drug money.  Our task, however, is simply to 
determine whether the jury could have rationally concluded 
that Claxton knowingly participated in the drug conspiracy 
and, as we have tried to make plain, we do not rely solely on 
his specific role in the conspiracy in concluding that a jury 
could make that finding.  Moreover, the fact that Claxton 
repeatedly had dominion over large sums of smuggled money 
does not diminish his culpability as a participant in a 
conspiracy that aimed to distribute cocaine for “significant 
financial gain and profit” (Joint App. at 43), but, rather, is 
part of the justification for the jury‟s conclusion that Claxton 
knew what he was doing. 
18
 The dissent argues that our reliance on Reyeros is 
misplaced because there is “no evidence that Claxton‟s 
relationships with his co-conspirators suggested a particular 
level of closeness akin to a fraternal relation that would make 
it more likely they would confide in each other.”  (Dissenting 
Op. at 8.)  That reading of Reyeros overstates the significance 
of the particular relationship at issue in that case.  As we 
observed in Boria, see supra note 11, evidence of a prior 
relationship between the defendant and the coconspirators 
was lacking in many of the cases in which we held the 
evidence of knowledge to be insufficient.  See, e.g., Thomas, 
114 F.3d at 405 (observing that there was “no evidence that 
[the defendant] had any prior relationship with [the alleged 
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known as “the farm” at which it stored its cocaine, and it also 
had a business known as the “feed shop” through which 
Springette‟s drug money was laundered.  Witnesses at trial 
testified that Claxton frequented both venues.  Wright and 
Roberts both testified that Claxton took them to the feed shop 
during their visits to the Virgin Islands, while Isaac stated that 
he visited the farm on at least ten occasions and saw Claxton 
and other organization members there during those visits.   
 
Isaac‟s testimony to that effect is particularly 
significant.  According to Isaac, the farm had a specific 
“function … to th[e] organization,” serving as a place where 
organization members would meet to “talk about drug 
activities and fight dogs.”  (Joint App. at 155-56.)  Although a 
jury reviewing that testimony might have concluded that 
Claxton simply “ke[pt] bad company,” which would not 
suffice to establish a conspiracy conviction, United States v. 
Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1977), the verdict instead 
reflects that the jury found that Claxton did know what he 
was involved in, and we are bound by that determination so 
long as it was not irrational,
19
 see Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133 
                                                                                                     
coconspirators], or even knew them”).  Its presence in this 
case is obviously not decisive as to Claxton‟s knowledge, but 
– as in Reyeros – distinguishes this case from those in which 
we have rejected drug conspiracy verdicts and helps tip the 
scale in favor of rationally inferring Claxton‟s knowing 
complicity.  See Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 98 (explaining that 
knowledge can be proven “grain-by-grain until the scale 
finally tips”).   
19
 Our dissenting colleague claims that the evidence 
“equally support[s] the inference” that Claxton had 
knowledge of drugs as it does “an inference that Claxton had 
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(“Courts must be ever vigilant in the context of Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29 not to usurp the role of the jury by ... substituting its 
judgment for that of the jury.”).  The verdict here is entirely 
rational, because Isaac‟s testimony regarding the 
conversations that took place at the farm, when considered 
alongside the rest of the evidence in this case, buttresses the 
fair and logical circumstantial inference that Claxton knew he 
                                                                                                     
knowledge that the conspiracy‟s object was weapons or some 
other contraband.”  (Dissenting Op. at 6.)  We cannot agree 
with that reading of the record.  The evidence at trial 
demonstrated that the organization which Claxton was a 
member of dealt drugs, not “weapons or some other 
contraband.”  (Id.)  There is no hint in the record that anyone 
thought the business of the conspiracy was guns or counterfeit 
Gucci purses or anything else.  It was a drug ring, and there is 
ample evidence that those involved, especially repeat players 
like Claxton, knew it.  Without repeating all of the evidence 
that we have outlined here, it is worth noting again that, in 
addition to the nature of his role and his identification by a 
coconspirator as one of the “member[s] of the organization” 
(Joint App. at 136) – not as an unknowing dupe of the 
organization – Claxton regularly frequented the Farm, where 
the nature of the conspiracy was openly discussed.  In any 
event, the fact that there might be competing inferences that 
can be drawn from the evidence is immaterial, because there 
is “no requirement … that the inference drawn by the jury be 
the only inference possible or that the government‟s evidence 
foreclose every possible innocent explanation.”  Iafelice, 978 
F.2d at 97 n.3.  The jury needed only to be able to rationally 
conclude that Claxton had some knowledge of the drug 
dealing in which he was involved, and it could certainly do 
that on this record. 
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was helping to transport drug money.
20
  See Cartwright, 359 
F.3d at 291 (circumstantial evidence suffices if it has a 
“logical or convincing connection to established fact”).   
 
Put another way, the fact that Claxton was identified as 
a member of a drug-trafficking organization by an admitted-
                                              
20
 Although we would uphold the jury‟s verdict 
regardless, Claxton‟s knowledge of drugs is further supported 
by the evidence regarding Claxton‟s visit to Atlantic City 
with Isaac during which Isaac attempted to make $60,000 to 
settle a cocaine-debt dispute with Mark.  Claxton contends 
that we should discount that evidence because Isaac did not 
specify when the gambling trip was made and the record can 
be read to suggest it occurred after the conspiracy concluded 
with respect to a post-conspiracy debt.  But because the jury 
heard Isaac‟s testimony about the Atlantic City trip and it was 
not stricken from the record, we must consider that evidence 
in our sufficiency analysis.  See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. 
Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (noting a reviewing court must “„consider 
all of the evidence admitted by the trial court,‟ regardless 
whether that evidence was admitted erroneously” (quoting 
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41 (1988))); United States v. 
Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 701 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); cf. Lightning 
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1198-99 & n.27 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence improperly admitted should 
not be considered in determining a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, but recognizing a different rule applies in 
criminal cases).  Moreover, even if the trip occurred after the 
conspiracy terminated, it demonstrates Claxton‟s close 
relationship with Isaac and thus advances the logical 
inference of Claxton‟s knowledge that the other evidence in 
this case prompts. 
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conspirator, that he repeatedly did that organization‟s bidding, 
that he was entrusted to help transport large sums of money, 
that he visited the place where that money was laundered, and 
that he frequented the place where the organization‟s drugs 
were stored and its business discussed all strongly suggest 
that he was aware of his role in the conspiracy for which he 
was prosecuted.  The totality of those circumstances was 
more than enough to allow the jury to rationally decide 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty.  See Brodie, 
403 F.3d at 134 (“In conducting the sufficiency inquiry, we 
do not view the government‟s evidence in isolation, but 
rather, in conjunction and as a whole.”); Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 
98 (noting that knowledge may be proven circumstantially 
“grain-by-grain until the scale finally tips”).   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 Consequently, we will uphold the jury‟s conclusion 
that Claxton was a knowing member of Springette‟s drug-
trafficking conspiracy, and will reverse the District Court‟s 
judgment of acquittal and remand for Claxton to be 
sentenced. 
  
United States v. Claxton,  No. 11-2552, dissenting. 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Although I agree with the majority that the evidence is 
sufficient to support an inference of Claxton‟s knowledge of 
his participation in an illicit conspiracy, I disagree that the 
evidence meets this Circuit‟s standard from which to infer 
that Claxton had “knowledge of the specific illegal objective 
contemplated by the particular conspiracy, i.e. [possession 
with intent to distribute] a controlled substance.” United 
States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481, 482 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(noting that this Circuit‟s standard to show knowledge in a 
conspiracy charge is perhaps stricter than other Courts of 
Appeals). As a result, I respectfully dissent and would affirm 
the District Court‟s judgment of acquittal. 
 
 The majority primarily relies on testimony that 
Claxton was a “member of the organization,” who was in 
charge of retrieving money couriers from the airport. While 
the majority acknowledges that this testimony does not 
“expressly refer to Claxton‟s knowledge of drugs . . . [and] 
require[s] the jury to make an additional inference to establish 
such knowledge,” it never articulates what that “additional” 
inference from which to infer knowledge is, let alone how 
that inference, or series of inferences, is logical. (Maj. Op. 20-
21.) Rather, the majority highlights additional facts—the 
large size of the organization, and that Claxton performed his 
role several times and had prior relationships with his co-
conspirators—as additional evidence which supports an 
inference of knowledge. 
 
 2 
 
The facts highlighted by the majority, taken 
individually or together, do not satisfy our requirement of 
“some additional piece of evidence imputing knowledge of 
drugs to the defendant.” Boria, 592 F.3d at 482.  Evidence of 
knowledge, or evidence supporting an inference of 
knowledge, might take a variety of forms, including a co-
conspirator‟s statement implicating a defendant, as in Boria, 
592 F.3d at 484, or a co-conspirator‟s trial testimony 
implicating a defendant, as the majority holds. But paramount 
to the form of evidence is its substance; by focusing on the 
presence of a co-conspirator statement implicating Claxton in 
the conspiracy to analogize this case with Boria, the majority 
overlooks the substance of the statements in this case and in 
Boria. In Boria, the co-conspirator‟s statement established 
that the defendant‟s role required him to have dominion and 
control over the contraband. In contrast, Claxton‟s co-
conspirator‟s trial testimony implicating him as a “member of 
the organization” and his subsequent descriptions of 
Claxton‟s role do not evidence that his role required dominion 
and control over the contraband; indeed, they establish the 
opposite. The additional facts highlighted by the majority do 
not fill the void of evidence—which, I agree, can be direct or 
circumstantial—from which to infer knowledge, even if 
viewed as a whole. As a result, the District Court‟s judgment 
should be affirmed. 
 
a.  Inferring Knowledge Based on Being a 
“member of the organization.” 
 
Although we have not explicitly so stated, an 
examination of our precedent to reconcile those cases in 
which evidence is sufficient with those in which evidence is 
insufficient reveals that an inference of knowledge can be 
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drawn from the fact of a defendant‟s participation in a 
conspiracy, i.e., identification as a “member of the 
organization,” only when dominion and control over the 
contraband is inherent to the role that the defendant agreed to 
perform. A comparison of Boria and United States v. Cooper, 
567 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1977), in which both defendants had 
control over a vehicle that transported drugs, illustrates this 
principle. In Boria, we held that the evidence was sufficient 
to support an inference of knowledge; in Cooper, the 
evidence was insufficient.  
 
The defendant‟s role in Boria was to drive a truck 
containing drugs to a garage and unload the drugs. Boria 592 
F.3d at 486. We held that this role imputed to Boria the 
requisite knowledge to sustain the verdict. The “additional 
fact necessary to support the jury‟s guilty verdict” was that 
“the tractor-trailer [Boria] was assigned to direct to a garage 
contained drugs.” Id. at 485. Acknowledging the suspicious 
circumstances establishing that “Boria knew something 
criminal was afoot,” we went on to state that “testimony that 
Boria was responsible for unloading the drugs . . . serves as 
the crucial additional fact imputing knowledge of drugs, as 
opposed to some other form of contraband.” Id. In reaching 
the conclusion, we relied on United States v. Iafelice, 978 
F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1992), in which there was sufficient 
evidence to support knowledge based on the “distinguishing 
fact” that the defendant owned and operated a vehicle used to 
transport drugs and “an owner and operator of a vehicle 
usually has dominion and control over the objects in his or 
her vehicle of which he or she is aware, and usually knows 
what is in that vehicle.”  Id. 
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In Cooper, 567 F.2d at 254-55, by contrast, the 
defendant and a co-defendant drove a vehicle containing 
drugs from Colorado to Pennsylvania. There was no evidence 
that the defendant had access to the padlocked rear 
compartment containing the drugs, or that he otherwise 
exercised control over the contraband. Despite the fact that 
the two spent several days alone together on the road and 
shared a motel room, giving them sufficient time to discuss 
the conspiracy and its object, the court did not infer 
knowledge based on the relationship between the two or the 
length of time of the transaction.  We held that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the defendant‟s participation in the 
conspiracy.  
 
Further, United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403 (3d 
Cir. 1997), shows that dominion and control over the 
contraband must be inherent to the role a defendant plays in 
the conspiracy (i.e., the job description agreed to), and not a 
consequence of the tasks the defendant was supposed to 
perform. In Thomas the defendant was asked by a co-
conspirator to check a hotel room to make sure a suitcase was 
there. The defendant obtained a key and checked the room.  
We found this insufficient to infer knowledge that the 
defendant knew what was in the suitcase. While the defendant 
had an opportunity to take control over the contraband, her 
role stopped short of her doing so. See also United States v. 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988) (where the only evidence 
against a defendant implicates him as a “look-out” or in a 
counter-surveillance role, with neither dominion nor control 
over the contraband, we have held that the evidence is 
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insufficient to support an inference of knowledge of the 
conspiracy‟s object). 
 
Moreover, we have held that evidence of knowledge 
was insufficient even when the defendant‟s role arguably 
required dominion and control over the contraband, albeit 
momentarily. United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 268 (3d 
Cir. 1998). In Idowu, the defendant‟s co-conspirator told him 
to open the suitcase that was supposed to contain the  
contraband and check that the contraband was there. But we 
still held that that the evidence did not support the critical 
inference that the defendant knew the transaction was a drug 
transaction prior to its occurrence. The only two inferences 
that were proper from the evidence were that the defendant 
had a preexisting relationship with the co-conspirator and that 
the defendant knew he was involved in an illicit transaction. 
These inferences were insufficient to support knowledge.  
 
In view of our precedent, the fact that the jury might 
have “rationally concluded that Claxton knowingly 
participated in the drug conspiracy,” (Maj. Op. 23-24 n. 17), 
is not a sufficient fact from which to infer Claxton‟s 
knowledge that the object of the conspiracy was drugs.  There 
is no evidence that Claxton‟s role in the conspiracy gave him 
any dominion or control over the contraband. He was solely 
in charge of retrieving women who were carrying money—
not contraband—from the airport, occasionally paying them, 
and getting them to their accommodations. While our 
precedent might support imputing to Claxton knowledge that 
the conspiracy involved large sums of money, some 
additional evidence is required to show knowledge of the 
conspiracy‟s object. The organization‟s size, “sums of money 
involved,” that it was “fair for the jury to understand that this 
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was not a task for just anyone,” and that “there is no hint in 
the record that anyone thought the business of the conspiracy 
was guns . . . or anything else” (Maj. Op. 25-26, n. 19) do not 
transform defendant‟s role into one that gave him dominion 
and control over the contraband—a necessary characteristic 
under our case law in order to draw an inference of 
knowledge based on a defendant‟s participation in a 
conspiracy. Nor do these facts otherwise support an inference 
of Claxton‟s knowledge of the specific object of the 
conspiracy. These facts might lead to a logical inference that 
Claxton knew of an illicit purpose of the conspiracy, but they 
equally support the inference drawn by the majority—
Claxton‟s knowledge of drugs—and an inference that Claxton 
had knowledge that the conspiracy‟s object was weapons or 
some other contraband. The fact that other members of the 
conspiracy knew of its object, an inevitable fact in any 
conspiracy, does not establish Claxton‟s knowledge. Indeed, 
to base a conclusion on such evidence would undermine our 
mandate that “guilt must remain personal and individual.” 
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quotations omitted).  As a result, I cannot agree that these 
facts establish “knowledge of the specific illegal objective 
contemplated by the particular conspiracy.” Boria, 592 F.3d 
at 481 (emphasis added). 
 
Further, that Claxton performed this role on multiple 
occasions does not create an inference of knowledge. Just as 
there was no evidence to suggest that the Cooper defendant‟s 
knowledge changed from the first day of the car ride to the 
last, no evidence suggests that Claxton‟s knowledge changed 
from the first transaction to the last, or provides any reason 
from which to infer that it should have changed. The sole fact 
that Claxton performed virtually the same role repeatedly 
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does not impute knowledge of drugs to the defendant, as 
opposed to knowledge of any other contraband. 
 
b.  Claxton’s “association with and close 
proximity to other conspiracy members.” 
 
In addition to evidence of the size of the conspiracy, 
Claxton‟s role in it, and the number of times Claxton 
performed the role, the majority states that an inference of 
Claxton‟s knowledge could be drawn from “his association 
with, and close proximity to, other conspiracy members and 
facilities of the organization.” (Maj. Op. 24.) In making such 
an inference, the majority discounts our clear findings in 
Idowu that a prior relationship could be inferred and the 
defendant was a “trusted member” of the conspiracy and our 
holding in that case that there was insufficient evidence of 
knowledge. Idowu, 157 F.3d at 268.  Moreover, the majority 
does what this Court has repeatedly warned against: it infers 
knowledge based on a defendant‟s presence at a crime scene, 
e.g., Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 286-89, and “keeping bad 
company,” Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91. And it contradicts our 
mandate that “guilt must remain individual and personal.” 
Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 
 
To draw an inference based on Claxton‟s relationships 
with his co-conspirators, the majority relies on United States 
v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008); but the majority‟s 
reliance on Reyeros in support of this proposition is 
misplaced.  In Reyeros other evidence had already “tip[ped] 
the scale in favor of rationally inferring” (Maj. Op. 24-25 n. 
18) knowledge of the conspiracy‟s object: there was direct 
evidence of knowledge. Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 279 n. 12. In 
Reyeros, a co-conspirator testified that the defendant, a 
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Customs Inspector who was conspiring to import cocaine, 
told another co-conspirator, who was the defendant‟s brother, 
that the defendant would not work with a quantity less than 
500 kilos. As we held, “[t]hat testimony is sufficient to allow 
a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
[the defendant] was aware that the purpose of the conspiracy 
was to import cocaine as opposed to some other form of 
contraband.” Id. at 279. This was direct evidence of 
knowledge because the defendant‟s quantity requirements 
would be meaningless and without any context otherwise.  
 
Against this backdrop of direct evidence of 
knowledge, in a footnote we stated that the prior relationship 
between the defendant and his co-conspirator in Reyeros was 
an example of “other evidence [that] support[ed] the 
conclusion” because the “jury could reasonably infer that 
[defendant] would ask his own brother [] the nature of the 
contraband for which he was putting his Customs career at 
risk.” Id. at 279 n. 12. This evidence was insignificant to the 
holding in Reyeros. And to the extent that it is relevant to 
“knowing complicity” (Maj. Op. 24-25 n. 18), “knowing 
complicity” in a conspiracy does not establish knowledge of 
drugs.  Furthermore, even if Reyeros tangentially supports 
drawing an inference or knowledge based on a prior 
relationship, the case is easily distinguishable from Claxton‟s.  
There is no evidence that Claxton‟s relationships with his co-
conspirators suggested a particular level of closeness akin to a 
fraternal relation that would make it more likely that they 
would confide in each other, or that Claxton risked losing any 
type of gainful legitimate employment, let alone a “career” by 
performing this role. And, to the extent that the Reyeros 
defendant‟s job as a Customs Inspector might be a basis for 
an inference about his competency and intelligence, from 
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which it might have been reasonable to infer that he would 
have sought complete information, no evidence supports any 
inference about Claxton‟s intelligence or level of 
sophistication. 
 
In the same footnote, we also highlighted the 
testimony that the defendant was going “to receive a 
percentage of the value of any cocaine imported, which 
suggest[ed] that [the defendant] would want to know the 
nature of the contraband so that he could understand the 
payoff.”  Id. No evidence of how Claxton was compensated, 
or that his compensation was in any way linked or related to 
the contraband, is in the record. 
 
The majority also relies on the fact that a co-
conspirator saw Claxton at “the farm”  and that the 
organization‟s members “talk about drug activities and fight 
dogs” at the farm.  At best, this establishes that some 
members of the conspiracy knew of its object. But, like in 
Idowu and Cooper, there is no evidence that Claxton was part 
of or privy to any conversations about drugs. Idowu, 157 F.3d 
at 266; Cooper, 567 F.2d at 254. See also United States v. 
Rodriquez-Valdez, 209 Fed. Appx. 178 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(although in an unpublished decision, we held there were 
insufficient facts to support defendant‟s knowledge under 
remarkably similar circumstances currently before the court 
because there was no testimony that the object of the 
conspiracy was ever discussed with the defendant or in his 
presence). An inference of knowledge under these facts 
requires inferences that Claxton‟s co-conspirators would 
speak freely around him, that Claxton was at the farm while 
drugs were being discussed, and that he was in close enough 
vicinity of any discussion to hear it. Like in Idowu, there is 
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“no evidence that would justify the jury‟s inferential leap” 
between these inferences. Idowu, 157 F.3d at 269. 
“Conspiracy cannot be proven „by piling inference upon 
inference‟ where those inferences do not logically support the 
ultimate finding of guilt.” Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134 (citation 
omitted). Indeed, the fact that another of Claxton‟s co-
defendants was seen at the farm, but not involved in any 
illegal activity (JA 117), establishes, consistent with the 
principle that guilt should not be presumed based on presence 
at a crime scene, Cartwright, 359 F.3d at 286-89, that 
presence at the farm alone cannot be a proxy for knowledge 
of the object of the conspiracy. 
 
Finally, the majority states that an alternative basis 
from which to infer knowledge is the trip Isaac and Claxton 
took to Atlantic City after Isaac received and sold his last 
shipment of cocaine from Mark. (SA 8, JA 174.) Even 
assuming that this evidence could be properly considered, 
inferring knowledge based on this trip requires an inference 
that Isaac discussed the purpose of the trip with Claxton, and 
that he specified that the debt he sought to pay related to the 
conspiracy of which Claxton was a part and mentioned drugs. 
Claxton could have thought that the trip was simply 
entertainment. And, even drawing these inferences, it is 
impossible that any discussion occurred during the conspiracy 
because Isaac‟s need to take the trip arose after he sold the 
final shipment of cocaine from Mark, and, therefore, after 
there is evidence of Claxton‟s participation in the conspiracy. 
See Idowu, 157 F.3d at 269. 
 
c. Evidence as a Whole 
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The majority urges that the “totality of circumstances” 
establishes Claxton‟s knowledge. But the totality of 
circumstances, while relevant to contextualize a specific piece 
of evidence from which to infer knowledge, does not support 
a logical inference of knowledge when there is otherwise no 
evidence from which to infer knowledge. In both Boria and 
Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97, we highlighted the totality of the 
circumstances, characterized them as “suspicious” and 
sufficient to support an inference of knowledge that 
“something criminal was afoot.” Boria, 592 F.3d at 485-86. 
We then relied on a specific piece of additional evidence to 
support an inference of knowledge of the conspiracy‟s object. 
We emphasized that these pieces of evidence distinguished 
the cases from precedent holding there was insufficient 
evidence. Similarly, in Reyeros, we highlighted the totality 
circumstances to bolster the direct evidence of knowledge. 
Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 279 n. 12.  
 
Unlike in any of these cases, where we held there was 
the “additional evidence needed to uphold a jury verdict of 
guilty,” “[m]ore evidence was needed to establish that 
[Claxton] knew drugs were involved in the crime.” Iafelice, 
978 F.2d at 98. While the totality of circumstances might 
support an inference that Claxton “knew that something 
criminal was afoot,” there is no “crucial additional fact 
imputing knowledge of drugs, as opposed to some other form 
of contraband.” Boria, 592 F.3d at 486. 
 
For the foregoing, the evidence is insufficient to show 
that the defendant knew that the object of the conspiracy was 
drugs, rather than some other form of contraband. I, therefore, 
respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
